environment by ensuring full and truthful disclosure of all material information.” Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 719 (S.D. Cal. 1996). Congress decided shareholders and corporations are entitled to Schedule 13D information, and holding a Board vote before Plaintiff’s plausible allegations are resolved would irreparably harm interests Congress protected expressly. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted “in corporate control contests[,] the stage of preliminary injunctive relief, rather than post-contest lawsuits, is the time when relief can best be given.” Piper, 430 U.S. at 42 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The court, therefore, finds Plaintiff has established sufficient risk of irreparable harm to warrant injunctive relief.
Defendants submit three challenges to Allied’s irreparable harm theory, all of which the court rejects. First, the Knighted Parties argue they mooted concerns regarding full and truthful disclosure of all material information by attaching the Complaint to their June 12, 2025 Schedule 13D. Knighted Opp’n at 25; Dkt. 54-16 at 5, 7–32. They point to Vestcom International, Inc. v. Chopra, 114 F. Supp. 2d 292, 300 (D.N.J. 2000), to argue disclosure “of a dispute and possible outcomes in the Schedule 13D [are] all that is required” when a Section 13(d) allegation is made before a proxy vote. Knighted Opp’n at 25.
Vestcom International is distinguishable and inapposite, as (1) there was no board election pending in that case, (2) the defendants, there, filed amended Schedule 13D forms that corrected one of the two nondisclosures at the heart of the plaintiff’s claims, and (3) the SEC promulgated new rules after the plaintiff filed its complaint, rendering the second nondisclosure legal. Id. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 299. In contrast, attaching a copy of the Complaint to the June 12, 2025 amended Schedule 13D, here, did not correct the alleged nondisclosure of the Knighted Group and moot this action, as the Knighted Parties continue to dispute Plaintiff’s claims and deny forming a group.
Second, the Knighted Parties reject the premise that it will be difficult to “unscramble the egg” if the election of directors proceeds at the Annual Meeting without injunctive relief. Knighted Opp’n at 26. Courts have recognized that “[a]n uninformed vote does not itself amount to irreparable harm if the difficulties inherent in unwinding large corporate transactions are absent.” E.g., Johnson as Tr. Of Johnson Fam. Tr. v. Saba Cap. Mgmt., L.P., Case No. 1:22-cv-04915-AT-BCM, 2023 WL 1345717, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, however, the vote at issue involves replacement of all directors—who the Knighted Parties have accused of breaching their fiduciary duties and malfeasance. See Knighted Opp’n at 10. If the Knighted Parties were to prevail, the newly elected directors could dismiss this action—preventing Plaintiff’s claims from being resolved on their merits. Furthermore, based on So’s testimony at the hearing, it appears the Knighted Parties may seek Allied’s liquidation if they were to prevail. See Hr’g Tr. At 11–13. The court, therefore, will leave the egg unscrambled.
Finally, the Knighted Parties argue Allied’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrates the lack of irreparable harm. Knighted Opp’n at 27. According to the Knighted Parties, the timing of Plaintiff’s Complaint and this Motion shows “strategic delay,” given “Allied states in the Complaint that it discovered the purported ‘scheme’ by March 2025.” Knighted Opp’n at 27–28 (citing Compl. ¶ 71).
The Knighted Parties misrepresent the cited portion of the Complaint, which states:
Allied was not aware of this scheme until it discovered the massive increase in Naomi Choi’s stock holdings. Specifically, Allied noticed that Ms. Choi had become the Company’s third largest stockholder in less than a year. In fact, she owned zero stock in Allied prior to January 2024, and thereafter acquired approximately 310,000 shares before July 2024, and an additional 1.1 million shares between July 2024 and March 2025.
Compl. ¶ 71. Plaintiff does not allege it discovered the purported “scheme” by March 2025, as the Knighted Parties contend, but rather that the “scheme” was discovered at a later date, when Allied noticed Naomi Choi had acquired 1.1 million shares between July 2024 and March 2025. See id. In fact, Plaintiff states it “became aware that Ms. Choi and Ms. So had become the Company’s third and fourth largest shareholders” in late May and early June 2025. Dkt. 31 at 8. Plaintiff filed its Complaint on June 11, 2025, Dkt. 1, and the Motion on June 27, 2025, Dkt. 30. This timing does not suggest any “strategic delay.” The Knighted Parties’ argument, thus, fails.
The Knighted Parties also argue that “given Allied’s admission that it regularly receives non-objecting beneficial owner (“NOBO”) lists, it is not credible that it did not know of Ms. So’s ownership by at least December 2023, when she was the third largest stockholder on the list, or [Naomi] Choi’s by July 2024, when she was sixth.” Id. at 28 (citations omitted). This argument is unconvincing.
While Allied knew about the Knighted Parties for at least a year and a half, it likely would have been difficult to determine whether Naomi Choi and So were affiliated with the Knighted Parties. Reply at 19. So’s legal name is “Yiu-Tung So,” but her name appears on the NOBO lists as “Rebecca So.” See, e.g., Dkt. 31-5 at 2. Determining the